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What 'Counts' as Law? by Anthony D'Amato
in Law-Making in the Global Community, Nicholas G. Onuf, ed.,
(Pub. under auspices of Center for International Studies, Princeton University),
Carolina Academic Press, 83-107 (1982)
Abstract: A reader of jurisprudence might conclude that only philosophers raise the question whether
international law may be said to exist or is really law. But in terms of frequency, the question is probably raised
more often by governments and states that are not trying to be philosophical. The increasing attention being paid to
the need for, and the procedures for, objective validation of rules of international law in a burgeoning literature of
international law evidences the seriousness of the problem, the responsibility of scholars for careful scholarship in
this area of legal theory, and ultimately the good possibility of generally accepted standards for that kind of
objective validation.
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BASIC PREMISES AND BUILDING BLOCKS
The Term Law in the International Arena
[pg83]* A reader of jurisprudence might conclude that only philosophers raise the
question whether international law may be said to exist or is really law. But in terms of
frequency, the question is probably raised more often by governments and states that are not
trying to be philosophical. Hitler might have had genuine doubts whether his plans for
aggression and territorial aggrandizement were contrary to law, and if told they were contrary to
international law he would have felt the same urge to deny the meaning of the term "international
law" that other heads of state have felt when purported legal rules stood in the way of their
policies. Since Hitler died before the international legal prohibitions against unjustified
aggression were actually enforced against individuals at Nuremberg, he may have gone to his
death thinking that he had done nothing illegal. But did those legal rules depend upon subsequent
"enforcement" before they could claim'" the title law?FN1 In what sense can we divorce law
from its subsequent enforcement?
To begin at the most basic level possible, let us consider the categories of possible words
that can be used to change or modify human behavior. We start with any person who has a
choice, who can pick one of two courses of action or who can decide whether to go ahead or not
to go ahead with one potential course of action.FN2 Certain kinds of words or messages can be
communicated to him that might influence his choice. Someone might say, for example, "Plan A
would be right but plan B would be immoral." That assertion might be backed up with arguments
appealing to all kinds of sources, particularly the would-be actor's, that might give content to the
meaning of morality. A second kind of message might be, "If you do A, my friends and I will
help you; but if you do B, my friends and I will punish you." This threat of sanction,
which may have no moral content, can effectively influence the actor providing that he is
persuaded of the likelihood, credibility, and severity of the threat. A third type of message, at
first glance quite different from those involving morality or physical sanction, is "If you do A
you will be acting legally, but if you do B you will violate the law." Accompanying this [pg84]
message will be arguments showing that A is indeed legal under the rules of law acknowledged
by the actor and B is illegal. FN3
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Is the legal message different in kind from the moral message or the sanctions message?
Certainly we might postulate a purely imaginary society where the mere invocation of the term
law is enough to channel all behavior in legal directions. In such a society no one has any
intention of violating the law provided information is given as to what courses of action are
illegal, and hence there are no violations of law and no enforcement machinery (police, prisons,
etc.) Human society probably will never reach such a system, but surely we cannot deny the title
"law" to the rules of that system simply because there is no need for enforcement. Nor can we
insist that the rules are necessarily rules of morality as we understand the latter term, because my
brief description of the imaginary system is complete without reference to the content of their
rules. But now, descending to earth and taking human nature as it is, must the legal message have
components that are also moral and physically enforceable? Natural-law theorists insist law is
close to morality while positivists insist that it is close to "that which is enforced."FN4 How
close? How necessarily close? These are questions which would take more space to deal with
than is available here. We do not have to ask these particular questions to work out an
understanding of the term international law for the purposes of this volume. Yet we have some
guidelines, at least psychologically if not philosophically, for the interpretation of the legal
message in terms of either the moral message or the sanctions message.
If rules of law were consistently at odds with generally understood rules of morality or
justice, soon "cognitive dissonance"FN5 would intrude to vitiate the influence that the legal
message would have upon our conduct. If we live in a system of immoral laws, we will spend
our time thinking of ways to act illegally and subvert the system so as to establish a new system
where the new laws will be entitled to respect. Surely a system of immoral laws will not last long
if there is a psychological dissonance between its rules and those of morality. But now one can
argue: what if the immoral laws are strictly and brutally enforced? This brings us to the positivist
assertion of the interdependence between law and sanctions. But let us hold for a moment the
case of enforcement of immoral laws, and consider first the relation between law and sanctions
where we do not add the complexity of whether the rules are moral or immoral.
Let us now imagine another strange and purely imaginary society: a dictator has recently
taken complete control over the military and police, and he announces that he [pg85] will enforce
his own wishes whatever they will be and whether or not they are legal. He cares nothing for the
legal system as it exists in the country prior to his take-over, and he will neither attempt to
change nor enforce it. He then engages in a series of actions, some of which he openly admits are
illegal, such as condemning for his own use without paying for it a large house owned by a
private citizen and a swimming pool owned by a private corporation. Since he controls the police
and the army, private resistance is futile. Perhaps he even enjoys admitting that his actions are
illegal, since that gives him a greater sense of power. Now, could we argue that his actions are
not illegal because he controls the physical power of the state? If so argued, we would be
contradicting the express conclusion of both the dictator and all his subjects. We would find
ourselves, on the outside of that society, adhering to a definition of legality that is at variance
with that of everyone in the society. Quite the contrary, it makes perfect sense to claim that,
although the dictator can get away with it because he controls the state's enforcement machinery,
his illegal actions are not suddenly made legal because of that control any more than a criminal's
theft is made legal because he got away with it. Yet, having said this much, we must also predict
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that in a short period of time that society will experience a cognitive dissonance between rules of
law and morality. Every parent knows that in teaching certain rules to children (such as the rule
"Don't play in the street") the rule occasionally must be enforced, so as to make it stick.
Otherwise the child will begin to disregard those rules that the parent sees the child violating but
does nothing about. Yet it is not necessary that the parents enforce every rule, so long as the rules
are clear, obeyable, and subject to enforcement. The authority of the rules will erode if they are
not enforced more or less consistently. When the opposite of certain rules are enforced, at first
one might conclude that the enforcement is illegal but later one might conclude that it is the
opposite of the rules that truly constitute the law. Thus, the dictator's actions at first will be
perceived to be illegal; after a period of time people will begin to wonder if they will not be
better off it they recognize that the rules that the dictator enforces are those that are truly rules of
law and the rules he is apparently violating are only the old rules of the pre-dictator regime.
Applying the preceding example to the case of enforcement of immoral laws, we can now
see that if a system of immoral laws is systematically enforced, the people will be caught
between two conceptions of law. On the one hand they will be reluctant to recognize the claim
that they ought to obey the law in a moral sense, but on the other hand they will have to concede
that there is no conflict between the asserted rules of law and the enforced rules. Surely this
system will persist somewhat longer than one where the laws are simply immoral but there are
no sanctions for disobeying them. Yet. the seeds of revolution must exist in the system, for the
people will resent the enforcement of immoral laws even more than they would resent immoral
laws that are not enforced. (Of course, the opposite is possible: the people may begin to learn a
new standard of morality by virtue of repeated applications of legal rules that are enforced, but
we are here dealing only with the assumption that in a given system laws are perceived as
immoral and continue to be so perceived.)
Thus, we have some conclusions to draw from the above examples which are not
necessarily rigid as a matter of philosophy but rather seem to be dictated by basic psychological
observation. A legal system might exist at any moment in time that is totally divorced from
moral standards, but it will probably not last long; similarly, it is hard to imagine how it came to
exist in the first place since rules of law tend to evolve from moral considerations.FN6 Similarly,
a legal system might exist at any moment in time [pg86] that is totally divorced from what the
state will enforce, but over the longer run an accommodation will set in between what is legal
and what is enforced. Yet it is no test of any individual law that it must be enforced to be a law.
The international law against unjustified aggression existed in 1939 even though it wasn't going
to be enforced until 1946 and even if it hadn't been enforced in 1946. It existed by virtue of the
fact that it was contained in the. messages Hitler could have received from other subjects of
international law at that time. The legal arguments justifying the particular law against
international unjustified aggression of course had to be made, and made persuasively, but for
present purposes we are assuming that those arguments could have been made. Our preliminary
conclusion here is only that if those arguments could have been made, then there was an
international legal rule against unjustified aggression in 1939. That rule was not dependent upon
its later enforceability. Its status as law was dependent solely upon the assertion and belief by
other actors that the rule was in fact a rule of law that was binding upon Hitler and capable of
influencing his course of action. FN7
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International Law in the Present World Community
The preceding arguments at best have shown only that a communication that a given rule
is a rule of international law is prima facie as viable a claim as any other claim that a given rule
is a rule of a particular legal system; what remains is the authentication of the given rule and not
a dismissal that the claim is erroneous because of considerations having to do with the morality
or enforceability of the rule. But even this much may be an important building block toward the
construction of international law, since it avoids metaphysical inquiries into the nature of
international law or the positivist claims that the content of law depends necessarily upon that
which is enforced.
Yet authentication of an alleged rule does depend to some extent upon its congruence
with the other two types of messages, those of morality and sanctions, for the simple reason that
international law has persisted in roughly its present form through several centuries and hence
we are not taking a time-slice of that law at an unrepresentative moment in its history the way
we're doing with respect to the imaginary systems considered above. But even with this
concession, international law today is undergoing some fundamental changes. Its relation to the
normative (moral, natural law) realm as well as its relation to the enforcement (sanctions,
positivist) dimension helps determine its actual content. This is not to say that a morally desirable
rule is hence a rule of international law, nor to say that what the major powers might enforce
(e.g., that only they are entitled to have nuclear weapons) is for that reason a rule of international
law; such simple correspondences between the desired and the actual are quite alien to my
contentions here. Not only are the relationships far more complex, but most importantly we are
dealing with an objective realm of law and not with the law as we would like it to be. Any writer
of course is tempted to write in his pet contentions to· the substance of international law that he
purports objectively to describe, and as I have noted elsewhere, the force of one's own contention
for what the law ought to be is helped by claiming that such rules of law are objective truths and
not mere desiderata.FN8 We must try to overcome the temptation to write in our own
preferences if we are purporting to describe an [pg87] objective reality. But nevertheless the
previously mentioned relationships of law to the normative and enforcement realms remain and
we have to deal with them objectively.
An important beginning has been made in the preceding chapter by Nicholas Onuf.
Professor Onuf has set out the basic relationship between international law and the assumed
objectivity of the positivist model as appropriately modified by H.L.A. Hart and Gidon Gottlieb.
Additionally, he has demonstrated the basic tension in present international law between states as
traditional subjects of that law and the rising claims of individuals against foreign states or even
their own states. Unquestionably international law is being subjected to a kind of strain that is
unprecedented in its history, yet the prognosis is not at all a pessimistic one.
The basic reason for guarded optimism is that respect for international law seems to be
going up in a world where the use of military force among states seems to be going down. This
simple observation constitutes a deep paradox for positivists, which as we shall see may be a
good reason why positivistic theory is quite inadequate in its explanatory power. For if
positivism views as necessary a correlation between the efficacy of law and its enforcement, then
an increasing diminution in enforcement measures might seem to call for a degradation of the
4

power of law itself. Yet in the nuclear age international law seems to elicit increasing respect.
Several explanations are possible. First, the existence of weapons of mass annihilation may have
concomitantly reduced the number of wars but increased the stakes if any war were to break out;
thus positivists might claim that international law is more enforceable than ever even if it is less
enforced. But this claim would seem to be met by the argument that major powers would hardly
resort to the use of nuclear warfare to ensure observance of international law, and hence for this
particular purpose ICBM stockpiles are paper tigers. Second, perhaps respect for international
law is more importantly connected with the internal stability of most national regimes coupled
with increasing literacy on the part of the world population. These factors ensure that people are
most sensitive to law in general, and hence their receptivity to international law in particular
might be increasing. One might respond, however, to this argument by noting that the factors
mentioned here have been around a long time, and thus do not seem to constitute a full
explanation for the post-World War II situation. Third, one might contend more frontally that
international law in fact is not on the ascendant since the International Court of Justice hardly has
any cases they days compared to its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice.
But this observation would apparently equate the number of international disputes (and hence
cases) with the existence of law; surely the fewer the disputes the more we can say that a legal
system is truly efficacious. Moreover, the many disputes that exist today are not being resolved,
except in rare but highly conspicuous instances, by the force of arms. The disputes are being
resolved by negotiation and accommodation, with international lawyers playing important roles.
Legal arguments are being heard and they are making a difference, even though they are not
often heard formally in courts such as the ICJ. Fourth, and lastly, one might account for the
increasing role of international law in the world affairs today by claiming that positivists are
right after all, except that they have looked for sanctions in the wrong place. Instead of highly
visible punitive sanctions, international law today is largely enforced through a spectrum of steps
short of acts of warfare. All kinds of harassment might follow upon a nation's violation of an
international rule; moreover there will be legal retaliation. (You've broken one rule, we'll break
another) or economic retaliation (You've broken a rule, we'll raise tariffs solely against [pg88]
your country).FN9 Let us revert for a moment to the parent establishing a rule for a child; the
parent need not spank the child, for many other measures of disapproval are possible. The parent
might withdraw some expected reward, or the parent might simply express displeasure, which a
well-raised child might find to be as much of a sanction as another child might find physical
punishment. But as the notion of sanction becomes attenuated, even conceding that thus it
becomes more realistic, it begins to depart from the positivist model. If a parent's mere
annoyance that a child has broken a rule constitutes a sufficient sanction in the eyes of the child,
we may properly ask whether this is a sanction at all or whether it is merely an inherent attribute
of law or authority. Most citizens obeys most laws—even laws that are morally neutral such as
obeying a traffic signal—not because they calculate the odds of being caught and penalized but
almost reflexively, as if not to do something which the state has rightly said should not be done.
Additionally, the notions of legal retaliation and harassment may not themselves be a full
explanation for the sanction theory, since many people believe that two wrongs do not make a
right. If nation A allegedly violates international law, we do not automatically expect nation B to
demonstrate A's violation by in turn doing something illegal. In other words, we do not wait for
B's sanction to determine whether A has violated the law. Rather, we simply expect B to respond
that A has violated the law—and it doesn't even matter that B in fact does make such a response.
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The expectation of such a response undoubtedly deters many nations in A's position from
violating the law in the first instance.
If we can conclude that an objective reality called international law is increasingly
important as a factor in helping to modify conduct in the world community—or, what amounts to
the same thing, to structure the range of possible alternatives so that only some courses of action
appear reasonable and legal—we must next turn to the substance of the relationship between
international law and the naturalist and positivist theories that are so important in determining its
content. In the preceding chapter Professor Onuf considered these relations largely from a
historical viewpoint. Within that general context, let us look at the relationships analytically.
The Opposing Viewpoints of Positivism and Naturalism
I want to argue in this section that positivism and naturalism represent fundamentally
opposing epistemologies; and in the next section I will contend that international law today
reflects, and necessarily absorbs, the naturalist position.
Although historically it might appear that positivism was a nineteenth century
Benthamite-Austinian movement in jurisprudence, in fact a positivist perspective is implicit in
the writings of Plato and St. Augustine and even to some extent in the writings of the "father of
natural law" St. Thomas Aquinas.FN10 Positivism is more than an insistence upon the
importance of sanctions as suggested earlier in this chapter; it is more than the "command"
theory of law of John Austin or subsequent refinements as outlined by Professor Gnuf in the
preceding chapter. Rather, at the essence of positivism is a world outlook that might be described
as existential—a denial of imminent [pg89] purposiveness, an emphasis on the present fact of
existence no matter how absurd those facts might seem to be. A legal positivist believes that a
rule is or is not a rule of law, and if it is a rule of law, then what it commands, however absurdly,
gives rise to a legal obligation. Lon L. Fuller once suggested an example that indicates this point
clearly: a statute is enacted which contains the word not preceding its operative paragraph,
rendering the entire statute meaningless or exceptionally misleading and frustrating to anyone
purporting to divine its command.FN11 A court believing in naturalism might take the position
that the word not was included by error either when the bill was read before the legislature or
later when it was printed in the public code, and thus strike out the word. But a positivist court
could not do so, no matter how absurd the consequences, because a positivist court would
investigate only whether the statute was validly enacted.FN12 If valid, it must be enforced as
written; only the legislature can later "remedy the mischief" if mischief there be. Positivism does
not require a court or an interpretive body to make sense out of law, but merely to apply it as
enacted. Nor does positivism place any requirement upon the legislature; the latter may enact
anything into law provided it is in fact the legislature validly engaged in enacting rules. A
legislature may enact nonsensical, or impossible, or retroactive laws; it may enact some laws but
keep their contents secret from the public; it has total license to command, and a court is required
to apply its commands as dictated by the words of the statute and not any extrinsic test of
meaning. Positivism, in short, is a special kind of theory of meaning; it takes the denotations of
words and asks for strict application. It treats legal rules as it would treat electronic
commands fed into a computer. The computer must obey the commands exactly, with no
attempt to omit a word such as not or to change the meaning of any words. (Of course, a
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computer may be programmed to correct for certain errors; but it is nevertheless
commanded to obey the program without correcting the program for errors. In other
words, the computer is not human.)FN13
An entirely different view of the world is suggested in the teleological philosophy of
Aristotle, taken up in the bulk of the writings of St. Thomas, and fed decisively into international
law by Pufendorf and Grotius. This nonexistential view of law is that the law must make sense as
applied to human behavior. A rule of law is something that is enacted by humans in order to
fulfill certain human purposes. The purposes, or ends, are really what is important; the law is
merely a means to their attainment. Hence a statute that obviously contains a mistake can be
corrected by a court. A law that commands people to do the impossible, or that is selfcontradictory, or that is deliberately kept secret from those to whom it is purportedly addressed,
is not entitled to be interpreted as law by any body, such as a court, that is charged with applying
it. A naturalist does not equate courts with computers; he does not strive for realization of the
words of the law at the expense of its purpose to regulate and order the relationships among
people. A naturalist is a peculiarly human interpreter of law; he assumes that the law does not
exist [pg90] for itself but rather is a means toward the attainment of human ends. A naturalist
must deny the strictly causal theories of some scientists who assert that only material events can
precede other highly correlated material events. As Professor Taylor has shown, a teleologist (or
for our purposes, a naturalist) necessarily assumes that a future event (an end) influences in the
present a line of conduct.FN14 This can only happen for thinking beings who have a vision of an
end they want to reach and who use that vision to shape their interpretation of various means that
are presented to them. Thus, purposiveness becomes a part of law-interpretation and hence of
law-content. The existentialist-positivist, on the other hand, adopts a strictly material causal
philosophy, insisting that rules of law be interpreted only according to the present denotative
meanings of the words in those rules irrespective of consequences.
Reduced to their essentials, positivism and naturalism thus proceed from two
contradictory views of the world: men as machines acting out what could be an absurd drama,
and men as teleological beings concerned with future consequences of alternative courses of
conduct. While the notion of men as machines may today sound pejorative, in fact for the past
three hundred years this picture has been the dominant philosophy in legal circles due to a certain
intrinsic attractiveness that it possesses over the naturalist view. One aspect of this attraction is
the certainty and efficiency of the positivist view: why allow a court to second guess a legislature
when the result may be more "common law confusion" of that type that Bentham excoriated?
FN15 Another aspect is the apparent scientific quality of positivism: here, at last, is a pure
science which, according to Kelsen and other enthusiasts, could finally be made objective. FN16
Recent years have seen many positivist theorists trying to account for the loose ends in the
framework of scientific positivism; though reality seemed elusive, they hoped that by further
refining positivist theory all the disconcerting facts of law as actually applied by human beings
might be brought within the positivist framework. A final aspect of the attraction of positivist
theory is that it promised to divorce any commentator's own views of what the law should be
from his description of the law that is. Here, at least, is an important and significant endeavor,
but perhaps one need not embrace positivism to ensure its fulfillment. By exercising great care—
more than a positivist writer need exercise—a naturalist-oriented writer can still divorce his own
predilections from his description of the law that exists, even though his description of the
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objective existing law necessarily includes purposive-oriented standards of the law that ought to
be.
Historically, positivism certainly corrected the common law excesses of naturalism as
ridiculed by Bentham.FN17 In this sense it was and has been a healthy corrective. But I want to
argue next that present-day international law reflects. the naturalist and not the positivist
perspective, and that this reflection has great substantive significance.
Natural Law and International Law
The notion of teleology in naturalism is more than an empty formality to the effect that
perceived future purposes can guide present actions. The historical development of [pg91]
natural law contributes the essential substantive fact that human purpose is everywhere pretty
much the same, that people strive for (roughly) the same basic values, and that the meanings we
can attribute to norms of international law make sense in the same sort of way to widely
divergent peoples in developed and developing nations alike. Were it not for the essential
sameness of human nature, so insisted upon by St. Thomas and assumed in the writings of Myres
McDougal and his associates,FN18 natural law would be deflated into existentialism, with a
person becoming a purposeless being in a world that may be absurd. Natural law is a nonarbitrary set of human standards that retains its meaning for all people at all times in all places.
Its claim is, for this reason, arrogant; but the opposite claim sells humanity short.
The increasing assertion of human rights against the depredations of governments is an
example of substantive natural law in the international legal arena.FN19 Natural law combines
two great substantive principles: the goal of survival of the human species, and justice to
individuals. Any artificial entity, such as a state, that stands in the way of the attainment of these
principles is contrary to natural law (as the greatest philosopher of the state as an entity—
Hegel—fully realized in his strictures against natural law). The relation of the state to the
naturalist needs of the world community will be more fully considered in the next part of this
chapter.
It is instructive to note that anyone's list of basic human rights is invariably universal in
its claim. Equality under the law or freedom of speech or the rights of women, for example, are
not claimed for a particular region or a collection of states in a certain economic classification;
rather, these and other human rights are asserted to apply to all people wherever situated. The
push toward universality in such claims is a natural concomitant of the naturalist perspective. If
law itself does not mean arbitrarily different things in different places, under naturalist theory,
then certainly rights and freedoms should also be grounded in universality.
St. Thomas talked about "right reason" as the meaning to be given to natural law.FN20
His scope was global; by "right" he did not mean "right only in the context of Western Europe
during the Middle Ages." And "reason" was not the exclusive province of Churchmen (no
wonder that true natural law was a subversive doctrine insofar as the Catholic Church was
concerned, the Church after St. Thomas emphasizing the primacy of "Divine Law" and canon
law over the dictates of right reason). The tendency toward universality is probably inherent in
any contemplation of the right as distinct from the expedient course of action for any person to
8

take. If something is right, it is right in all similar contexts whatever the time or place. Surely
killing another person for private gain is wrong throughout the world; regardless of the wide
variances in cultures, we can still recognize murder when we see it, and we can distinguish it
even from tribal sacrificial rites or state executions of criminals or self-defense. But what about
abortion? Is that murder? Didn't St. Thomas so hold? Doesn't the abortion example prove the
non-universality of so-called natural law? What if the right to abortion were to appear on a
United Nations list of basic human rights?
We must relate abortion, as any other substantive claim, to the two fundamental natural
law principles: perpetuation of the species and justice to the individual. In St. [pg92] Thomas'
time, there was a perceived threat of underpopulation to the future of the human race. Indeed,
seventy-five years after his death, the plague decimated Europe. In that context, abortion was a
crime against the future survival of the human race. Today, perceptions are quite the opposite:
the threat to human survival is more a matter of overpopulation than underpopulation. Far from
being a threat to human survival, abortion today may be an aid to the future of human life on this
planet. But we can well imagine a future where nuclear devastation has left few survivors, and in
such a context abortion again might be linked to future survivability and hence be prohibited by
"right reason."
But medieval strictures against abortion have had an important psychological effect,
which today is manifested in the feeling of the sacredness of human life. This feeling too is very
important to the survival of the species. Much of this feeling is manifested by the antiabortionists, and even those who disagree with their position must concede that the antiabortionists are not acting out of selfish or hedonistic motives but rather are articulating a basic
feeling of the sacredness of life that might tend to be downgraded in an overpopulated world.
(Studies of animal overpopulation invariably show behavior that becomes predicated on the
pervasive assumption that life is cheap and reproduction is unnecessary.) Thus a U.N. right-toabortion plank might be counter-productive in downgrading the sacredness of life at the same
time that it would be productive in asserting the rights of women and helping to reduce global
overpopulation. We can only conclude that the abortion issue is necessarily complex, but
certainly does not destroy the universality of the claim that what is paramount is the survival of
the species.
Focusing upon species survival also brings out the relevance of environmental protection
in the international law context. Persons or governments have no right ,to destroy the life
sustaining environment or permanently deplete it of, for example, an animal or plant species;
such actions endanger the future survivability of the human race. Often in the short-term, even if
measured by the life span of an individual, environment-depleting actions can be economically
profitable (even to the point that it would not pay others to deter such actions.) Only natural
law—and the effect it is having upon substantive international law—may stand as a realistic
deterrent to such actions.FN21
Professor Falk has well described the fundamental disparities among peoples today and
the challenges faced by the world community.FN22 There is an extremely unequal distribution
of wealth. Nuclear armaments are stockpiled that can destroy all life forms forever. The world is
overpopulated and many are starving to death. Our natural environment is being poisoned and
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resources necessary to organic life are wantonly exploited. And superimposed upon all these
problems is the nation-state system, where governments pursue narrowly defined bureaucratic
values often at the expense of the people. Such governments can no longer be changed by the
threat of war, for nuclear war against any major government will equally destroy victor and
vanquished. All that is left is law and, perhaps, right reason. But international law as we know it
is largely state dominated. Its subject-creators traditionally have been nations, not persons. And
while we are seeing a transition from states as exclusive subjects of international law to people
increasingly obtaining international legal rights, described by Professor Onuf in the preceding
chapter, we still are faced with the problem that traditional international law might be unable to
meet world needs because it assumes subject entities that are nations and not persons.
[pg93] Nations as Subject-Creators of International Law: The Basic Context
International law suggests a system of laws between and among nations; in this classic
view, states are the creator-subjects of that legal system. But there are other logical possibilities.
Mankind might have refused to recognize all artificial entities; international law could have
meant, simply, the law governing transactions among individuals across national frontiers (the
nations, in this case, not constituting separate legal entities but merely names for aggregations of
individuals in geographic areas). Present international law Seems to be on the road to
recognizing individual actions as part of international adjudication in limited areas such as the
European Court of Human Rights. Another possibility would be to recognize artificial
international entities other than states-multinational corporations and intergovernmental
organizations, for example. A more revolutionary approach would be the extreme form of
functionalism described by David MitranyFN23 where all governmental functions are performed
by international agencies and bureaucracies, that presumably then would be the sole subjects of
international law. The above possibilities are generally conceived at the substate level, but other
possible forms of international legal interaction could occur supranationally: regionalism (a
region might include states and parts of states) and world organizations, both of which could
impose law downward upon states and people. As Professor Onuf has remarked in the first
chapter, the present system is dominated by the relations of states even though writers disagree
about how significant an inroad has been made by other forms.
How do these various forms relate to the overwhelming problems confronting mankind
today: environmental degradation and the threat of total nuclear war? How do they relate to other
problems that may not involve destruction of the human species but just as seriously affect the
meaning of life: human freedoms and rights, relief from overpopulation, freedom from hunger
and severe poverty? A natural law perspective would hold that a rational relation between the
forms of the legal system and the basic needs of mankind is more than a desideratum; it is a
necessity. Yet two enormous tasks impend: First, we must attempt to solve the theoretical
problem of determining what forms, in detail, are most rationally related to the solution of these
problems; second, people and their governments must be persuaded to operationalize these
forms. No matter how hopeless or utopian this second task of persuasion might seem, we cannot
even undertake it without first solving the theoretical problem.
The remaining chapters in this book are addressed to aspects of the various forms, present
and emerging, that constitute the international legal system. My task in the rest of this chapter
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involves a partial examination of the first and most traditional form of international law, that
involving states as subject-creators. I will be concerned primarily with mechanisms of lawcreation among states, but some preliminary consideration might usefully be given here to the
concept of state in political philosophy and its potential relevance to the basic challenges to
human survival on this small planet.
Four possible notions of a state are as follows:
(1) A state is nothing at all; it is a mere word giving a name to all the people within a defined geographic
area.
(2) A state is an entity independent of the people within it; it is a force in itself; it is a right in Hegel's sense.
[pg94] (3) A state represents more than people in a geographic area, because it represents the human
species—dead people (tradition in Burke's sense), living people, and potential people.
(4) A state represents not only past, present, and future persons, but also a symbiotic tie between these
people and the land they live on (exemplified in the writings of, among others, Mazzini). Under this view,
people living in one state would become different people if they migrated to a different state.

The first possibility might be labelled as liberal in today's terms, the second reactionary.
Perhaps without states we would not be in a position today to fear thermonuclear destruction. On
the other hand, if nuclear weapons were invented in a nationless world, certain individuals might
obtain a monopoly and terrorize everyone else. In short, we must not confuse theories of how
mankind got into its present predicament with rational solutions for getting out of it. Now that
nuclear weapons are stockpiled that can destroy all life and continue to "make the rubble
bounce," are they best controlled by a state system or by some other kind of system? Perhaps a
state in the third sense given above might have a collective rationality greater than that of
individuals. An individual, after all, could believe in taking the world down with him—après
moi, le déluge. But a number of governmental officials, some of whom have families, might not
think the same way. Perhaps there is conservatism in collectivity. Similarly, with respect to
environmental degradation, it is not at all clear that governments will act less responsibly than
other entities, including persons or multinational corporations or regional associations. There is
cause for great despair at the lack of progress among governments in stemming the destruction of
species such as whales, in reversing global air pollution or destruction of the stratospheric ozone
layer, or in checking the population explosion; yet would other forms of legal organization
behave any better; and if there are any, how are they better? These questions are not rhetorical;
obviously much thought has to be addressed to them in the years ahead.
My limited task here is to show that some degree of rationality, at least, results from the
fact that international law is not created out of the whims of individual states (their policies, their
unilateral declarations, their claims) but rather is created out of interstate relations. Since states
try to survive, and since their survival is predicated on some minimal degree of order, their
interactions—forming universal customary law—will normally be rational in the natural law
sense of being purposive.
My discussion will be in terms of a referent—that of a logical validator of what assertions
"count" as rules of the system. This attempt to search for a mechanism is prompted by a natural
law perspective, for the mechanism presumes that states do not act arbitrarily and that their
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interactions reflect a consensus about mutually desirable rules. To say this much is not to assert
that the present international system is capable of solving the problems of environmental
degradation and thermonuclear destruction but rather simply to examine what the capabilities
might be in a formal sense. Let us, therefore, turn to an examination of the mechanism for
generating interstate rules.
THE RELATION OF RULES TO STATES
International law is more than a communication that affects state behavior. It also defines
international reality. The law tells states when they are injured; states feel no pain and hence
have to be told when they are hurt. The law also tells states what appropriate responses may be
made to such injuries. Law defines the scope of a nation's legitimate interests—its entitlements.
A nation may want many things that it is not entitled to have—e.g., to import inexpensive oil, to
have exclusive fishing rights to the Atlantic Ocean, to add to its territory at the expense of
neighboring nations. But only its [pg95] entitlements as defined by international law constitute
claims which, if not recognized by other states, tend reciprocally to adversely affect the
entitlements of those other states. Finally, international law erects a structural perspective for
interpreting international claim conflicts.
The competing interests of states inevitably clash in the international arena. International
law in the first instance serves as a sort of signal to tell states which of these clashes are
acceptable and which are deserving of retaliation. A mental experiment may help illustrate this
function of law. State A is wealthier and militarily more powerful than its neighbor state B.
If both states need to import oil but state A consistently outbids state B for the oil so that most of
the short supply goes to A and not B, state B normally would have no justifiable complaint
against A and would not attempt any retaliatory measures outside of possible economic
retaliation. If state B were to commit a hostile act against A—e.g., imprisoning 100 of state A's
nationals resident in B until state A lowers its bid price for the oil—we can well imagine that A's
reaction would not be to lower its bid price but rather, perhaps, to imprison 120 of state B's
nationals resident in A. In short, B has reacted inappropriately to A's economic aggression by an
illegal act; A's economic aggression was not illegal but B's act of imprisonment was illegal and
was perceived to be illegal by A which retaliated in kind. If B were then to retaliate again by an
even greater illegality, B could only expect another round of retaliation in kind. This no-win
strategy is probably why we would not ordinarily expect B to engage in an illegal retaliation for
A's legal initial action.
Now let us change the situation by supposing that A, having cornered the supply of oil,
decides to drop some bombs on B's few domestic oilfields. The bombing is clearly an illegal act
that would engender retaliation by B. Even though A is militarily the more powerful state, it
would probably refrain from committing such an overt unprovoked act against B. The sheer
illegality of the act would undoubtedly transform B into a tougher opponent than B was on
paper, for B would feel justified in fighting back, her citizens aroused, whereas A's citizens
might be reluctant to fight very hard in such an unjustified cause. Of course, actual wars are
never so simple, and nations can fight for what seem in retrospect to be unjustified causes. But I
am trying to show why a great many potential wars never get fought. They do not arise because
most nations do not initiate illegal aggressions upon weaker neighbors.
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A final point needs to be made about this thought experiment. A's initial cornering of the
oil supply might have had extremely deleterious consequences for B; perhaps many more
citizens of B starved to death due to the lack of oil to power farm machinery than the 120
citizens that might be hurt if B started a chain of retaliation. Yet the amount of real suffering
visited upon a nation is no test of legality. In the present world at the present time, international
law tells us that it is legal for one nation to outbid another in the international oil market, but is it
is illegal for one nation to imprison the nationals of another nation without legal cause. State B
may feel much more pain from a legal economic attack than from an illegal physical attack, yet
the law tells B that the legal pain is not a pain at all but the illegal physical injury, however
slight, is justification for retaliation or resort to third-party intervention.
What underlies this strange set of legal injuries that states experience? We should
examine the fundamental structural assumptions of the international legal system. Perhaps one of
the best ways to get a perspective of that system is to take some of the central assumptions of
international law and imagine what the world would be like without them. If successful, this
exercise in imagination will do more than give us an analytical perspective. It will help narrow
the class of purported international norms that [pg96] cannot become rules of law because they
do not share the basic characteristics of international law as we have come to know it.
One of the most basic and deep-rooted postulates of international law is that of the
sovereign equality of nations. Suppose, instead, that international law had evolved differently.
Suppose the law reflected accurately the differences in the armed might of the various nations.
The law would give more rights and privileges to the stronger nation, and fewer to the weaker
nation. The United States and the Soviet Union might have, say, an exclusive fisheries coastal
zone of 200 miles, Canada 100 miles, Chile and Mexico 50 miles each, and Costa Rica 25 miles.
Of course this result seems strange, but its strangeness is because we are all conditioned to
accept the notion of legal equality. In particular, the most powerful states naturally assume in
negotiations such as the Law of the Sea Conferences that whatever the breadth of contiguous
zones may be adopted, the breadth will be the same for all coastal states. In this, among many
ways, the notion of equality of states under international law is a powerful force operating to the
advantage of weaker states. When newly emerging and third-world states claim that international
law was invented by European powers for their own interests and that norms of international law
can be freely accepted or rejected by the new 'nations, they are essentially taking a doctrinal
position for bargaining purposes that they might reject if they stood the chance of losing all the
benefits of international law.
Another basic characteristic of international law is that any rule in the system must
prohibit at least certain kinds of actions. A rule of law means that the actor must refrain from
doing something that he otherwise might have been inclined to do. Sometimes writers cast their
nets so broadly as to include within international law everything that states do; the result is to
find law everywhere, but at the great loss of making it impossible for any state to violate the law.
This supererogatory result is sometimes found in the writings of Professor McDougal and his
associates when the claim appears to be made that if certain states share the proper values and act
with the proper motives, everything they do is legal.FN24 On the opposite extreme, some writers
claim that the laws of warfare are not true laws of international law because they seem to have
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little if any power in fact to prohibit the actor from doing what he wants to do in a wartime
situation.FN25 But this view is probably erroneous both from a factual and a theoretical
perspective. Factually, the laws of war like any other laws indicate what initiatives are legal and
hence subject to legal retaliation, and what initiatives are illegal and hence open up extreme,
impassioned, and sometimes unrestrained retaliation, Even in the bitterest wars there are
hundreds if not thousands of understood reciprocal restraints in small and large matters affecting
both sides. These restraints are keyed around perceived legalities and illegalities of the conduct
of warfare. Of course, the restraints sometimes break down, hut. even in domestic law not all
laws are always enforced by prosecutors, and certainly all laws are not always obeyed (the rising
crime rate does not mean that criminal laws are losing their status as legal prohibitions).FN26
And from a theoretical standpoint, positivists in the Austinian tradition, particularly Kelsen,
have insisted upon finding [pg97] some sanction behind all laws. These writers find it
particularly difficult to deal with the laws of war because in a war there is a breakdown of an
authoritative sanction-source to enforce laws. FN27 What these writers seemed to have failed to
appreciate is the consequence of viewing law as a set of words. The words of law that specify
primary delicts are not unlike the words of law that command those who would enforce the law.
A prosecutor in domestic law can violate the law that commands him to prosecute murderers just
as the murderer can violate the primary law against homicide. But if the prosecutor decides not
to prosecute—even if he announces that he will no longer prosecute any criminal matters—we
do not say that there are no longer any primary laws against crime. A crime is still a crime;
someday some official might attach a penalty to it. Similarly, in wartime, the failure, no matter
how widespread, to enforce certain laws of warfare does not mean that these laws have vanished.
Their violation is always potentially capable of being penalized—after the war, or as retaliation
during the war. What is significant is that the law has characterized the event, and in thus
characterizing it, has said that a future sanction could legally be applied to it. This is all that law,
as a set of words, can ever do. What actually happens as a consequence of the violation of legal
norms is by and large a matter of post-legal behavior.FN28
An important consequence of the view that international law minimally prohibits certain
classes of actions is that we should view critically any claim that unilateral declarations of law
are per se evidence of what the law is.FN29 A nation may claim anything; it may make a claim
for something that is patently illegal just to see whether other nations will let it get away with the
claim. Similarly, an attorney general's opinion is not evidence of the content of international law,
nor is a nation's pleadings in an international dispute (obviously there are two sides to a dispute
and both cannot be right). The tendency of some writers to amass claims of all sorts—often those
made in an international forum such as the United Nations—and use these as evidence of
international law can paint a misleading picture of the content of international law. Indeed, it is
probably not too great an exaggeration to say that most statements by nations (including their
diplomatic speeches and writings, foreign office correspondence, attorney general opinions,
writings of their own establishment of international legal scholars, and public mass-media
speeches) are carefully contrived for the purpose of eliciting advantage in the vast process of
international negotiation, and are not—even though many purport to be—restatements of
international law. If anything an interested party says is evidence of law, then international law
in total would hardly prohibit any actions at all. There would be no point in calling it law.
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Finally, let us consider a third basic postulate of international law: the unidimensionality
of rules. It is characteristic of rules that, where they apply, they apply completely and fully to
that and to similar factual situations. Rules do not arbitrarily apply sometimes to the same factual
situations; nor do they require a mere attempt at compliance or give the affected state discretion
whether or not to obey them. Conceivably we could have had [pg98] other dimensions to rules,
giving them the character of weights which may or may not be taken into account. To some
extent, the notion of "principles of law" as formulated by Ronald DworkinFN30 and as reflected
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of JusticeFN31 applies as a weight to be
added into the balance in international decision-making. But rules or norms of law must be
sharply distinguished from principles. As to rules or norms, the only important question is
whether or not they are rules of the system of international law. Of course, we may have so
called emerging rules of the system whose status is uncertain. But as to the latter, the debate is
whether the rule has or has not arrived; significantly, the debate never is addressed to a
compromise position that would accord to the rule a half-status between law and non-law. We
would not know what to do with a rule in this grey area. Nations want to know whether or not
they are currently bound by an alleged rule of international law. The line between law and nonlaw is crucially significant in international law. Our task, then, is to try to specify how the line is
to be drawn. Of all the alleged rules and norms that on their face could be rules of international
law, how do we select the smaller set of rules that actually are rules of that system?
An Objective Validator of International Law
Prior to the nineteenth century it hardly occurred to anyone to desire an objective test for
determining what was the law and what was not the law. The law—whether municipal or
international—was rooted in immemorial custom, in natural law, in eternal principles, and in
reason. If there was a dispute, a judge would decide the question, his decision contributing to the
clarity of the law in its restatement of what everyone should have known anyway. But legislative
reform gave the impetus to a rethinking of validating procedures for the law. Bentham's desire to
change the content of the common law through legislation led him naturally to question the
authenticity of the common law.FN32 Austin, who did not share Bentham's antipathy to the
common law, nevertheless theorized that the common law owed its efficacy only to its being
adopted by the sovereign.FN33 Breaking from the centuries-old tradition that the law was
binding on everyone, Austin, doing for law what Bodin and Hobbes had done for political
philosophy, posited a sovereign who was above the law and under whom law existed through his
sufferance. The sovereign became the objective validator of all law; what he commanded, or
allowed, was law; nothing was law that was contrary to his commands. Finding his view of law
inapplicable to the international arena because of the difficulty of locating a sovereign there,
Austin redefined international law as not being law but mere "positive morality. FN34
But the simple mechanism of a sovereign being the objective validator of law even in
domestic systems increasingly was shown to be deficient. First, laws that defined and accounted
for the succession of sovereigns could not themselves be sovereign commands. [pg99] Second,
in some systems it became very hard to locate the sovereign at all. Attempting to cope with this
latter difficulty, Hart has posited the idea of the sovereignty of a "rule of recognition."FN35 But I
think that Hart's solution will eventually fail for the same reasons as Austin's. In the first place,
Hart cannot account for changes in the rule of recognition or in its replacement by a successor
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rule. Secondly, in some systems the rule is fairly clear (as in states with a written constitution)
but in some it seems so diffuse and so rooted in common law and custom that the rule is too
broad to be helpful in its avowed purpose as serving as an objective validator.FN36
If Hart's conceptualization eventually fails for the latter reason, he nevertheless has
forcefully reminded us of the necessity for finding secondary rules in a legal system that account
for the creation and change of the primary rules. This is no less important internationally than
domestically. The set of international secondary rules that one might—if one feels the need—call
the international rule of recognition has usually been discussed under the misleading term
sources of law. The sources of international law do not form a closed set; there is nothing to
prevent the community of nations from someday recognizing a new authoritative source. The
open-endedness of the possible sources or validators of international law does not make it any
the less law than Godel's proof of the open-endedness of any mathematical system of an order of
complexity that would include the real numbers has made mathematics any the less
mathematical.
Consensus. One alleged validator of international rules is the consensus of states. We
have come to know the term consensus as denoting that situation where a rule or policy is
proposed and no one actively opposes it. Some may abstain from voting or may not be willing to
endorse the group decision, but a consensus may. still obtain. But consensus is not the same as a
majority vote. There is no international mechanism for creating rules by majority of states
through some sort of legislative process. For example, a resolution directed against South Africa
in the General Assembly of the United Nations, and actively opposed by South Africa, is not in
itself a rule of law by virtue of the consensus ofstates.FN37 Of course, the resolution might
reflect already existing law, but then it would be the existing law and not the resolution that
counts. As much as nations might want to transform General Assembly resolutions into law, we
must acknowledge at this state of world law that one actively opposed dissenter is enough to
destroy the consensus. The General Assembly may, in Professor Falk's term, have quasilegislative competence, but this is not the same as legislative competence.FN38
Nearly all rules of international law at present enjoy the status of law by virtue of the
consensus of states over time. We tend to regard the settled rules of international law as those
rules that are not actively opposed by a state or group of states. Sometimes the consensus has not
been derived by reference to the specific rule itself but to the other kinds of validators (such as
custom) which themselves are a product of the consensus of states. But consensus is not a very
useful mechanism for introducing new laws directly because adversely affected states can
actively oppose such rules.FN39 Proposed rules that [pg100] adversely affect the important
interests of states will not be adopted by the international community through any sort of
consensus mechanism. On the other hand, clarificatory rules and those which progressively
develop the content of international law are becoming incorporated into the body of international
norms through the slow and patient work of groups such as the International Law Commission.
By soliciting comments from states, these international groups engaged in progressive
development of the law often achieve consensus on a large number of proposed restatements of
the law by virtue of the states not objecting to the reformulations.
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Clearly the most important function of consensus is in its validation of the other
validators. The secondary rules relating to custom, treaty, decisions of courts, and so forth, are
the product of the consensus of nations and hence are the most significant means for changing
old norms and creating new ones.
Custom. The workability of custom as a validator of international rules stems
primarily from a nation's actions being far more conservative than its claims, desires,
threats, responses, and wishes. A nation might desire exclusive fishing rights to the
Atlantic Ocean; it might make a claim to a large area of that ocean; it might even issue a
legal opinion that it owns the fish in the ocean. But these wishes are not translated into
reality; the nation does not attempt to bar all other fishing vessels from the Atlantic
Ocean. Hence it was early perceived that a nation's actions in the international arena are a
far better guide to the underlying rules of law than its claims or its desires. When we
sum all nations' actions, we have a fairly good view of the implicit principles that channel
such actions in certain directions and not in others. Custom is grounded on this material
component of action (or abstention from action).
But not everything a nation does or does not do constitutes custom in the
international sense. When a nation taxes its own resident nationals it is not creating an
international rule of taxation; although Kelsen theorized that international law permits
such taxation, his argument was only a theoretical construct to the effect that everything
not prohibited by international law is permitted by it.FN40 When a nation extends a mere
courtesy to another nation (e.g., by displaying the other nation's flag on one of its city
streets), such an action does not form part of custom so that a rule is developed requiring
the nation to display the flag forever.FN41 Thus, to formulate a rule of customary
law, we must have both an act (the material component) and a characterization of that act (the
[pg101] qualitative or psychological component) as a norm of international law. I have
attempted to spell out these factors elsewhere and would not want to repeat them here.FN42
However, I would note a dissent to Professor Onuf’s view in the preceding chapterFN43 that the
only characterization or articulation of an act that international customary rules require is to
indicate which acts are not law so that all the rest of them can generate rules of law. To
my mind this would present an unnecessary burden on states to continually characterize
harmless acts as non-law (e.g., if a statesman signs a treaty with a fountain pen, he would
need to announce that he is doing so only as a matter of courtesy and not with a view to
generating a future law that will require the use of fountain pens if treaties are to be validly
signed). Of course, maybe states someday will welcome such a burden, but until they do, all that
Custom as a validator of rules of law seems to require is a positive articulation and not Professor
Onuf’s less restrictive negative disclaimer.
The articulation of an act as formative of a customary rule need not come from the
acting state; what is minimally required is that states be put on notice of the articulation.
Sometimes scholars can playa crucial role in the formation of customary law by writings
which amount to an articulation of a rule. A possible example is Professor Falk's
characterization of the three types of violent conflict in civil strife.FN44 In an area as complex
as irregular warfare, such an organizing principle might suddenly clarify what had previously
appeared to be divergent practices and suggest an implicit rule of customary law that the actions
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of states involved in civil strife were in fact substantiating. Inasmuch as Professor Falk's views
were published during the Vietnam War, his articulation was contemporaneous with the acts
themselves. It is too early to tell whether, in this particular case, new customary rules of
universal validity were set in motion that will affect the way nations will react in the future to
civil strife.
Treaties. Treaties and other international agreements tend to supply the bulk of
articulations of rules.FN45 Moreover, entering into a treaty is an act of a state, a legal
commitment to act or refrain from acting in a treaty-specified way. As a result, treaty
rules tend to become rules of customary international law (unless opposed by contrary
rules in other treaties).FN46 A treaty that creates a particular law for the parties is thus also
an instrument for the universalization of rules, not by virtue of what the parties intend
(because all they presumably intend to do is to make an agreement between themselves)
but by virtue of international perceptions about the rule-generating ability of treaty
provisions.FN47
[pg102] Judicial Decisions. Despite an uneven performance through the years and a
noticeably uncrowded docket, the International Court of Justice is perhaps the closest thing we
have to a tangible objective validator of rules. Its opinions are greatly respected and frequently
cited by states. Its judges today are more representative of the community of all nations than in
the past, but whether its caseload will expand is problematical.
Other international Courts of all kinds are feeder streams into the river of international
law. Can we include domestic courts as well, when they deal with international questions?
Professor Falk argues that we should, but in chapter 1 Professor Onuf indicates that such courts
are on a par with a unilateral opinion of a nation. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between.
Professor Onuf is right insofar as he is pointing out that a domestic court does not contribute to
the development of international law merely by saying that it is applying international law. But
any court does more than issue an opinion; it issues a decision. The decision itself can affect
international interests, and if erroneous can lead to retaliation by the foreign state. The decision,
moreover, embodies a concession for reciprocal treatment when a similar case comes up in a
foreign nation's domestic court system. In these respects, decisions of domestic courts involving
international questions directly contribute to the form of international rules by the process of
custom. The decisions are acts of states containing, in the accompanying opinions, their own
articulation.
Hence, we might conclude that the International Court of Justice, by virtue of its
acknowledgement by states, is itself a validator of international norms, whereas domestic courts
(which of course have no such international acknowledgement) may make their greatest
contribution by the operation of a previously discussed objective validator, namely, custom.
General Principles of Law. To Professor Onuf’s analysis in chapter 1 on "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" (as found in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice), I would like to add an observation based upon Professor
Dworkin's work that has not yet been applied to international studies. Professor Dworkin has
shown that there is something fundamentally different between a principle and a rule. FN48 A
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principle is entitled to a certain weight in the consideration of a decision, whereas a rule points to
an unambiguous result. A rule either applies or it doesn't apply; if it applies, it is decisive. But a
principle may apply and yet be overshadowed by other [pg103] principles. The principle "no
man should profit by his own wrong" is one that is found in most domestic legal systems, yet it
can be overshadowed in domestic law by, for example, the principle of quieting title to real estate
in a case involving adverse possession (where the adverse possessor clearly profits from his own
wrong). The principle that tends to invalidate contracts achieved by coercion does not apply to
treaties of peace between two states that were previously at war; here another principle, namely
the avoidance of further violence, validates unequal peace treaties. In the law of war, competing
principles are military necessity and humanitarianism, and, as Quincy Wright pointed out,FN49
the principle of ending the war quickly and the principle of securing a just and lasting peace (the
latter could be compromised if brutally illegal means are adopted to end the war more quickly).
These principles do not decide specific cases but they are factors in the decisions. The numerous
post-World War II military trials in Europe and Asia were often decided on the basis of these
principles, particularly in the sentences that were meted out, when the defendants pleaded
exceptions to the rules of the conduct of war that were applied to them.
General principles of law can thus be very important as weights or factors in
international legal decision-making. Their operation in this respect is very much like that
described by Professor McDougal and his associates, who however were talking about the
rules and norms of international law as well as principles (and thus perhaps cast too wide
a net).FN50 By virtue of the inclusion of general principles in Article 38, and also through
their basic familiarity to lawyers as described by Professor Onuf, "general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations" has become prima facie an objective validator of
international principles. When a given principle arises in a case or dispute, its proponent
should examine the domestic law of all the nations (if he has the time and resources to do
so!) and if he can show that most or all nations recognize the principle in their domestic
legal systems, he will have made out a prima facie case for the inclusion of that principle
in the international legal dispute. However, mere similarity in provisions in the laws of
many nations does not itself mean that a similar rule is a rule of international law. To lift
the rule from national to international status still requires some showing of customary
law—that the rule has been applied in at least one interaction between states.
Unilateral Declarations and International Law Formation. We have seen that
a unilateral claim or declaration by a state cannot per se be evidence of customary law
inasmuch as the claim may be patently illegal or it may be a trial balloon with the
claimant state not intending to follow through upon the claim unless the reaction of
other states is favorable. Yet in the past few years we have witnessed a proliferation of
unilateral claims on the part of coastal states to various kinds of exclusive jurisdiction or
control over contiguous zones of the high seas and submarine areas. Perhaps these claims
have been partially inspired by the success of the Truman Proclamation of September 28,
1945FN51 regarding the continental shelf of the United States. This famous proclamation
deserves a closer look with respect to the question of its impact upon general norms of
international law.
President Truman proclaimed that the policy of the United States was to regard the
19

continental shelf "as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control. "FN52 A month later Mexico followed with a similar Presidential Proclamation, and
[pg104] before the decade was over another twelve nations had issued similar unilateral decrees.
FN53 When, if at any time, was any law created by these decrees?
The Truman Proclamation did not descend upon an unsuspecting world. The United
States Department of State had shown a draft of the proclamation to representatives of Canada,
Cuba, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Mexico, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and
the Soviet Union, and none of the governments consulted expressed opposition, to the American
proposal to issue the proclamation.FN54 At least with respect to all the governments consulted,
we may say that a consensus had been reached prior to the date of Truman's proclamation. In
addition to this consensus, we must not overlook the fact that prior to 1945 there was scant
attention to the continental shelf, and certainly there was no rule of international law in
opposition to coastal state control over its continental shelf. Had there been such a law saying,
for example, that the continental shelf belonged to all nations equally, then the Truman
Proclamation would have had a harder burden of justification. Moreover, we might even assume
that if such a law existed, the nations consulted on the draft proclamation, or some of them,
probably would have objected. Therefore, we might conclude tentatively that the Truman
Proclamation articulated a rule that the world community was prepared to accept in an area
where there was no contrary rule or practice.
Now let us look at the situation a month or two after the issuance of the Truman
Proclamation. Other states now had a clear opportunity to protest. In the absence of
protest, we have additional evidence of a universal consensus. The evidence is not
conclusive, as I have argued elsewhere, because states may reasonably not want to protest
even though they disagree with the claim.FN55
Further evidence of consensus occurs when state after state issues decrees similar to
the Truman Proclamation. As time has passed and more states have become aware of
riches in the continental shelf, more states have issued such decrees. In more recent years
when some states have realized that the coastal states' claims deprive others of access to
minerals, the have-not states have complained, but then the objections may have come
too late. A consensus may already have been formed.
But apart from the operations of consensus, customary law was forming when states
began to act upon their claims. Truman's proclamation itself did not create customary
law; it supplied an articulation of a rule, but not any underlying practice. Nor was there
a commitment to act (as would have obtained had there been a treaty relating to the
continental shelf). But with the course of time, mining and fishing (sedentary) operations
on the continental shelves of various countries that were confined exclusively to nationals
or (even stronger evidence) licensed to non-nationals created customary law binding upon
all nations. It is by virtue of this practice, rather than the more frail need of consensus,
that the rule of coastal state jurisdiction is so strong today.
The continental shelf story contains lessons for claims today for exclusive jurisdiction
over wide contiguous zones. Suppose a nation claims that it owns 500 miles of the ocean
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perpendicular to its coastline. The claim may be expressed in a presidential proclamation,
in an amendment to the state's own constitution, or in any similar fashion. Such a claim,
unlike Truman's, intrudes upon an area already subject to a clear rule of international
law—the freedom of the seas. Now, what are we to make of such a claim?
In the first place, if the nation making the claim has previously shown a draft to a
[pg105] large number of states and has received no objections, then the claim might be
expressive of a new consensus. (There is nothing logically wrong with a new consensus of all
states that wipes out the previous rule of freedom of the seas—states in the aggregate are free to
change any rule of international law because they are the creator-subjects of international rules.)
If the nation making the claim does not show a draft to other states, we might assume that it
chooses not to show the draft because it knows that the other states would object. This
assumption, of course, stems from the fact that a contrary rule already obtains in the area of the
proposed declaration.
What is the status of the international law of freedom of the seas a month after a state
makes a unilateral claim to 500 miles of contiguous zones? Has the claim changed the
established rule? Has it even planted a seed of change? Here, I think we have to be careful and
analytically precise.
If the claim represents a new consensus, then of course it may be indicative of a change
in the underlying rule. But, in all likelihood, the 500-mile claim does not indicate a change of
attitude on the part of other states. If it does, then in due course we will see the fruition of that
change of attitude as other states make 500-mile claims and respect the claims of states that have
already made similar declarations; in that case, the process of consensus would be at work. But
let us now look at the single 500-mile claim in isolation. Suppose no other state has (yet) made a
similar claim. Does the single 500-mile claim itself change, even slightly, the underlying
freedom-of-the-seas rule?
Clearly no change has taken place at this point through the process of consensus, since a
single state by definition does not create a consensus. In the absence of other states issuing or
respecting similar claims, there is no consensus. A single state's unilateral declaration therefore
has absolutely no effect upon the underlying international rule through the operation of
consensus. For the consensus operation to work, we need many more than one state. What we
need is the participation of other states in the 500-mile rule plus the contemporary absence of
protest (or other forms of disagreement) from the rest of the states. Practically speaking, this is
unlikely, although, as I have noted, it is not logically impossible.
What then of the operation of custom as a universal validator of the 500-mile claim?
FN56 Let us look at the single state's unilateral claim. Does the claim constitute a customary
practice? Here the answer must be no. At best the claim articulates a rule which could be realized
by acts of the claimant state that affect other states. But an articulation of a rule cannot itself be
custom, for the basic reason that the claimant state has done nothing internationally except state a
claim. The claim itself runs contrary to the rule of freedom of the seas. The state issuing the
claim may not even intend to back it up; it may simply be issuing a trial balloon. Moreover, other
states would have no reason to protest this claim. They may believe that the issuing state does
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not intend to follow through on actualizing the claim, or they may believe that there will be
enough time to dispute it when the claimant state actually tries to do something in support of its
claim (e.g., seize another state's fishing boat 450 miles offshore). Finally, other states may
continue to act on the understanding that fisheries 450 miles off any state's coastline are open to
all states, and thus state practice is built up daily with respect to the rule of freedom of the seas.
This practice, all the other states may believe, is enough to overwhelm any attempt at a contrary
practice by the single state making a 500-mile claim.
[pg106] If the state's 500-mile claim has no impact, standing alone, either upon consensus
or custom as validators of the claim, is it a totally futile gesture from a legal standpoint? Of
course, it may start the ball rolling so that, if other states emulate and repeat the claim, eventually
consensus or custom may create a 500-mile exclusive jurisdiction rule in what was formerly the
high seas. But this is saying very little, for the legal impact of the claimant's proclamation
depends upon the actions of others. Is there no legal significance to the claimant's proclamation
standing alone? The only significance that I can find is that it is an invitation, an offer, for
reciprocal treatment that would amount to a treaty. State A makes a 500-mile claim. By such a
claim it is inviting state B both to respect the claim of A and to expect A to stay out of B's 500mile zone. If B acts accordingly, then a tacit treaty has arisen between A .and B. (Moreover, B
has joined in A's claim, and thus we have the real beginnings of a customary practice and
maybe even a start toward a new international consensus.) Thus, A's claim is not without legal
significance; rather, it is like an offer to engage in a contract.
International law could not be law if every act or claim made by a nation could be
justified. Some acts and some claims must be illegal; they must run afoul of the prevailing law.
The possibility for changing international law occurs when more than one state is involved in an
act or a claim. When one state acts and another state receives the action (e.g., A fishes off B's
coast and B allows the fishing to go on without interference), customary practice is either created
or reinforced. When one state makes a claim and another state agrees to the claim, a treaty is
established; the treaty itself then has the status of the practice of states and it creates or reinforces
universally valid customary rules. In sum, international law cannot be created or changed by one
nation acting; in splendid isolation. International law is law between (or among) nations; a nation
acting alone or making a unilateral declaration with no concurrence from other states is merely
operating in the domestic legal realm.
CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVE VALIDATION
There is something of a feeling among those who are introduced to the study of
international law that it is an indeterminate form of law lacking in provable content or authorized
validation procedures. According to Hart, international law in the present day lacks this "rule of
recognition" which, someday, will make it a "mature" legal system.FN57 Advocates in
international law cases sometimes throw in the kitchen sink in an effort to prove their
contentions; they cite anything that has ever been published if it will help their contention that a
given alleged rule is in fact a rule of international law. In so doing, they are imitating the father
of international law, Grotius himself, who seemed to draw upon any published source
indiscriminately to prove his contentions about the content of international law. And we cannot
blame Grotius or his present-day (sometimes unknowing) imitators; they are, after all, advocates.
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But judges have a different obligation, and so do nations in passing upon the claims of other
nations. If Iran believes that diplomatic personnel may be seized from an American embassy in
Teheran if they are spies for the American government, no responsible nation in passing upon, or
reacting to, that claim should allow the claim to be proved by citation of indiscriminate sources
(for example, a Marxist-Leninist tract to the effect that capitalist nations always illegally spy
upon other governments). Instead, reference to customary law and to the Vienna [pg107]
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 FN58 amply proves that diplomats are expected to
gather information about the host country and transmit it confidentially to their own country. Of
course, here the rule is clear, but in other cases where the rule is not clear we should not make
the mistake of concluding that, therefore, the sources of the rule are indeterminate. Not only is
too much at stake (rapid escalation of competing legal claims leading to military confrontation),
but also international legal theory has come a long way from the days of Grotius. The increasing
attention being paid to the need for, and the procedures for, objective validation of rules of
international law in a burgeoning literature of international law evidences the seriousness of the
problem, the responsibility of scholars for careful scholarship in this area of legal theory, and
ultimately the good possibility of generally accepted standards for that kind of objective
validation.
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